This essay results from re-considering issues in “Some Thoughts Concerning Consciousness” dated 2-10-2024 in this blog. A fully naturalistic point of view is retained, but with conceptual twists—a reframing—as I return to quandaries surrounding human consciousness and subjective experience. As the philosopher John Searle once remarked about the common impulse to reject naturalistic interpretations of consciousness, “what you’ve got in your skull is about a kilogram and a half, three pounds of this gook. How can that have all these thoughts and feelings and anxieties and aspirations? How can all the variety of our conscious life be produced by this squishy stuff blasting away at the synapses?” Well expressed, especially considering Searle was an articulate and committed philosophical naturalist, candidly describing consciousness as nothing other than a state of the brain. (Interestingly, he was skeptical of sophisticated digital systems ever functioning with human-like intelligence.)

My 2-10-2024 essay supported a key tenant of philosophical naturalism: human consciousness, and the whole of our complex neurobiological being, are the evolutionary consequence of exclusively biological adaptations. In principle, the occurrence of consciousness can be understood as the result of electro-chemical processes—explanations fully grounded in the physical and life sciences. Included in my earlier essay was the strongly-held biological principle of non-human animals fitting seamlessly into a consciousness spectrum. This central idea leads to a fuller argument, where the life sciences, in all aspects, support naturalism as a defining world-view of humanity’s place in the cosmos.

I also examined Roger Penrose’s proposal where consciousness does not arise secondarily, in an evolutionary sense, through conventionally conceived physical processes. Rather, consciousness results from “discrete physical events that have always existed in the universe in a proto-conscious state, and acted on by physical laws not yet fully understood.” Penrose sees biology’s role as evolving a mechanism orchestrating such events and coupling them to neural activity, creating consciousness (paraphrased from Penrose). He sees consciousness as an “intrinsic” part of the universe, in contrast to naturalism, where consciousness emerged through the evolution of complexity within specific genera of biological systems, and hence not fundamental—or “intrinsic”—to the universe in the sense of quarks or electrons. To a degree, Penrose shares an affinity for a moderate form of pan-psychism, a bridge to consciousness that reaches beyond our current view of physical processes. Throughout his career Penrose has offered creative and stimulating solutions to fundamental questions in science. Consciousness is no exception.

Discussed as well in the 2-10--2024 essay was the growing field of Basal Cognition, research empirically grounded and relevant to both Penrose’s conceptual model and naturalism’s emphasis on the exclusive role of evolutionary complexity. Their studies examined very small, multi-cellular creatures, so primitive to be without brains, yet exhibiting lower-level cognition with simple memory and learning capabilities. Such lower-level cognition—or proto intelligence—occurs without the clusters of neurons found in the brains of slightly higher-level animals, and relies only on subtle changes in electric fields within primitive, non-neural cell groupings. Cognition appears to build from very simple beginnings, with surprisingly sophisticated cognition occurring even near the lower end of life’s complexity spectrum (Levin and Lyons Scientific American 2-2024). While this research does not illuminate, or solve, what many see as the elusive character of consciousness, Basal Cognition research suggests substantial support for naturalism’s overall world view.

A key objective of this essay is clarifying how liberating it can become —enabling greater intellectual freedom and creativity—in questioning particular assumptions surrounding consciousness, including believing in its unavoidably elusive nature. Naturalism implies these views are likely misguided, and most seriously so in presuming any explanatory value results from postulating unknown forces or structures of the cosmos, that doing so could ever “explain” human consciousness. Philosophical naturalism claims our current knowledge, implicit in the life sciences and physics, is sufficient to support the likely truth of its overall world view. While necessary to fully acknowledge significant limits to contemporary knowledge, the efficacy of today’s conceptual models is so great, and so strongly supported, future, more comprehensive science will not dismiss their value, but see the science of today as not as inclusive, or as a subset of future knowledge. Importantly, current science will not be inconsistent with new knowledge, although likely less general.

Moving away from mind-sets relying on speculative assumptions, or thinking a satisfactory understanding of consciousness implies exclusively intuitive or first-person knowledge, requires a re-set of underlying perspectives. Our natural, default human points of view, by that I mean our common-sense conceptions of the world, were formed through multiple sensory abilities and problem-solving skills, developed over time through natural selection. For knowledge to have grown to its current state, the original limitations of our evolved perspectives have been remarkably enhanced by mathematics, sophisticated instrumentation and theoretical constructs (often counter-intuitive, yet supported experimentally). Whenever any number of established theories are considered—Einsteinian gravity, quantum field theory, particle/wave phenomena and other conceptual tools—their descriptions are expressed mathematically and experimentally, not by means of everyday language, sensory awareness or intuitive grasp. Often, they appear frustratingly counter intuitive, even bizarre, but the comprehensive knowledge now accessible and universally applied, pervades nearly every aspect of our lives. Millennia of human creativity have led to civilization’s remarkable treasure of knowledge.

When reflecting about our subjective experience, our conscious experience—its rich and frequently emotional character—we cannot experience an intuitive, first-person grasp of how it all happens. We cannot “see” self-reflection or emotional experience, even given its indubitable character as a defining aspect of our reality. But we should not dismiss the relevance and explanatory power of third-person knowledge of the origin and complexity of human neurobiology. Our understanding of neural processes will expand over the coming decades, and while not providing a strictly intuitive grasp of how subjective experience might occur, greater third-person knowledge can mask traditional intellectual and emotional barriers, lessening, and perhaps erasing, commitments to the primacy of intuitive, first-person knowledge.

Traditionally, consciousness has been accepted as the preeminent and controlling function of human cognition; it is not. Consciousness, and subjective experience in general, are properly described as but a portion of total human cognitive processing—our full, integrated psyche. Non-conscious processes are significantly influential—powerfully so—in forming human behavior: decision making, preferences, overt actions and behavior in general. Experimentally, the functioning of the human psyche is monitored electro-chemically, indicating specific locations affected in the brain as individuals perform various tasks. Also understood is the similarity in neurobiology between humans and other complex animals. While not identical, their structures and function tell the story of shared lineages. The complexity of life ranges incrementally from simple animals to modern humans. Other, much less complex phyla, accurately described as alive but limited to more primitive responses to their environment, are likewise found along the span of varied complexity. The biological principle of shared lineage firmly establishes humanity’s origin and place within the planet’s evolved patterns of life.

Acknowledging four related principles—reframing perspectives:

The Totality of the Human Psyche: consciousness is but one aspect of human cognitive functioning. Focusing predominantly on consciousness—as humanity’s presumed defining characteristic—distorts the character and multi-faceted structure of what we are, and that distortion can make it seem reasonable that consciousness must be generated in ways unlike the remainder of our psyche. Indeed, consciousness is remarkable and uniquely experienced in comparison to other cognitive functions, but thinking of consciousness as one of many aspects of an evolved whole, so strongly supported by current neurobiology, makes its evolutionary origin increasingly appealing, intellectually.

Biologically Shared Lineages between Species: closely related is the well-established biological principle of the relatedness of all terrestrial species. This continuum views humanity as one among a nearly infinite variety of biological species—systems dissimilar in complexity but similar in their molecular foundation. And cognition, in the most general sense, is present in non-human, yet neurobiologically sophisticated species. To enable their survival, even very primitive biological systems respond in limited ways to their environment. Also telling is the degree particular aspects of conscious awareness occur in higher-order animals, and while likely not identical to ours, their cognition and awareness are described by the life sciences as evolutionary adaptations, sharing significant neural structures and functions with humans. Accepting an extended consciousness spectrum leads seamlessly to embracing the evolutionary origin of human consciousness.

Epistemological Constraints: first-person (subjective), intuitive knowledge, while unique in some respects, does not hold primacy, and often is not useful for acquiring fundamental knowledge. This becomes apparent in much of science-based inquiry, although flashes of intuitive insight can be central to creative thought in science, or in any other human endeavor. First-person apprehension is noteworthy for its common limitations, constrained by the narrowness of sensory abilities and conceptual schema, becoming secondary for research and theory construction in understanding cosmic patterns. Abstruse theoretical constructs in the physical sciences yield remarkably precise predictions of phenomena, yet not “understood” in any intuitive sense by our human, every-day grasp of the macro-world. As Richard Feynman once remarked about epistemological constraints, no one really “understands” quantum field theory, although much of science-based inquiry is grounded on quantum theory. By “understand” Feynman was referring to intuitive understanding, acknowledging the counter-intuitive character of much of modern physics A strong parallel exists in the fields of neuroscience and neurobiology, where neuro-chemical processes are precisely correlated with first-person reports of specific cognition. And of course, quantum phenomena fill neurobiological processes. Naturalism pictures correlations between subjective reports and neurobiological processes as essential in understanding the nature of consciousness, and avoids the requirement of intuitive apprehension.

Failure to intuitively “understand” how neural-chemical processes create consciousness should not become philosophically unsettling, or require introducing pan-psychism. Indeed, the inability to intuitively grasp how consciousness occurs is predictable and unavoidable, reflecting epistemological limits to first-person, intuitive knowledge. In deference to the Enlightenment philosopher Emmanual Kant, we cannot apprehend the nature of “things in themselves”, their intuitively-grasped intrinsic nature. Likewise, we cannot intuitively apprehend the intrinsic nature of electrons, quarks, or any other fundamental aspect of the cosmos. But the theoretical constructs of advanced science provide the tools, the predictive and operational capacity, to develop highly effective third-person knowledge. Explanations must conclude at some point. Epistemological limits exist, and for a significant portion of science professionals and students, this limit is not unsettling when working in the physical sciences. It becomes consistent, justifiable and philosophically simplifying to view the biological sciences and neuroscience in a parallel manner. The lack of intuitive “knowledge” about cognition and consciousness does not preclude embracing a naturalistic description of our “mental life”, where evolved processes in the brain are understood as the origin of all our experiences, including self-awareness. This constitutes knowledge.

Further considering epistemological limits brings into question whether pan-psychism, or Penrose’s “currently unknown discrete events,” could logically offer an “explanation” more intuitive, or in some sense deeper, than naturalism. In effect, neither can satisfy the desire for a first-person, intuitive grasp of how consciousness occurs, or any other cognitive process. At best, pan-psychic alternatives only push the intuitive “deficit” in a different direction, toward a vaguely-defined realm, that in the end carries us no closer toward a classic, intuitive grasp. Thinking pan-psychism might resolve the intuitive deficit overlooks the wall of unavoidable epistemological limits.

The Convergence of Scientific Inquiry: This final paragraph re-affirms principles implied throughout the essay. Much of the power of naturalism’s view of consciousness stems from the remarkable convergence of scientific disciplines, a process initiated at the beginning of the Scientific Revolution and accelerating the past 100 years. Convergence has now reached a point where the boundaries of many disciplines are merging. The current inter-relationships between traditional physical and biological sciences, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, advanced computer science et.al, and their remarkable contributions to society’s bank of knowledge, are telling signs of how comprehensive the point of view of naturalism has become. It should cause one to re-evaluate presuppositions, whenever world views become significantly inconsistent with the current Knowledge Horizon.