Woven into this essay is a family of themes normally discussed in ethics and moral theory, but in this case augmented by Cultural Anthropology, the biological sciences and my view of human history. I am deeply skeptical of claims to absolute moral objectivity, where an ethical or moral standard is held to be unconditionally true, in some manner reflecting fundamental and indubitable aspects of the cosmos. That idea is a fantasy. Traditional beliefs in objective ethical truth, revealed through faith, have been central to the world’s great religions. And some Enlightenment thinkers hoped to find ethical certainty—objectivity—through rationality alone, or by means of a rationally-based understanding of the natural world. This essay’s goals are more pragmatic and less imposing by comparison, looking at ethical principles in general, and while accepting reasoning as legitimate for their justification, rejects the search for objectivity and absolute truth.

Ethics, and moral standards in general, have provided human societies the cultural structure essential for their very existence. Implied is morality’s singularly practical role. Moral/ethical standards are human creations, social frameworks necessary for the species’ survival and continuity—a response to the mammalian need for social bonding and support. Whether considering our Neolithic hunter-gatherer ancestors or contemporary nation-states, a social group’s shared moral standards enable a functional degree of cooperation, facilitating common goals, promoting stability, predictability and ameliorating harmful behavior. These common ethical standards receive impetus, and their near universality, from the human capacity for compassion and caring--feelings and behavior shared by other animals as well. The philosophy of naturalism—the over-riding theme of this blog’s essays—embraces a conception of Homo sapiens where behavior and social structures develop through evolutionary processes, with elements of both variation and similarity existing along the spectrum of ancient through contemporary moral systems. The human task of forging ways of living together has adapted to differing living environments, responding to both physical and social-political contexts.

A frequent theme in much contemporary moral theory is the significant degree of commonality between otherwise distinct cultural systems. And this fact is not surprising. No social group could long exist if commonplace norms such as promising, reciprocity, and prohibitions against random and unprovoked violence toward members, were not effectively reinforced. Given sufficient time, socially destructive behavior, if not minimally contained, will disintegrate any social body. Yet the reality of important differences in moral standards between cultural-social entities is likewise not exceptional, but to be expected. Consider the contrast between a full-blown libertarian-individualist ethic versus one grounded in egalitarianism and social bonding. That these contrasting points of view legitimately exist implies the folly of thinking an absolute (objectively true) ethic makes sense. David Hume’s philosophical stance that factual statements concerning “what is” (what is objective) cannot entail an absolute moral norm or obligation, "what we ought to do,” remains clear thinking today as much as it was in the 18th Century. No “ought” assertion can be factually true, although moral standards can be rationally supported, although not in the sense of true or false. Seeking to justify the absolute truth of any moral language by reference to a realm “external” to the human community, is conceptually an anachronism, at odds with Anthropology, the life sciences and human history. Distinct moral standpoints have developed from the serious, iterative process of forging societies—ways of living—even given the existence of a core, nearly universal group of moral principles. Those common principles appear essential to any stable society, although humanity will always include its extreme discontents—the outliers of sociopaths and those who disdain compassion in any form. How these individuals are restrained and limited in their impact poses a constant challenge for any civil society.

The foregoing view of ethics does not imply the absence of serious ethical disagreements arising from emotionally-laden, complex situations, even within a cultural group with near unanimity in their fundamental values. One example is the question of inalienable personal autonomy concerning end of life choices, a context often involving conflicting values. As human creations, ethical and moral standards are not absolute; shades of grey are unavoidable. Moral thinking, examined at the personal level, can be exceedingly challenging when conflicting values prohibit simplicity. A primary strength of pluralistic societies is their openness to significant variation in ethical choices, given those choices cause no harm to others.

As stated earlier, this essay regards ethical and moral standards as emergent from the interplay of our species’ physical and social environments, biological-genetic heritage and evolved cognitive capacity. Moral standards are practical in their genesis, forming a cluster of behavioral guidelines and boundaries enabling social groups to function. And due to their nature as human constructions, moral standards are open to fact-based critiques as to their implications—evaluating the character of a society resulting from their specific standards. This is the juncture where human rationality becomes relevant to moral-ethical discussions. The challenging task becomes describing the real-life effects differing moral systems might bring to a society, both as a whole and for individual members.

But trying to reach mutually acceptable descriptions of the real-life implications of ethical systems can easily lead to deadlock. Returning to the earlier example of world views—the libertarian-individualist versus an egalitarian-communitarian ethic—the ethical assumptions of either position will color their views of what constitutes either a positive or undesirable outcome, whether for the society as a whole or for individuals. No objective or common criterion is available to adjudicate issues. An egalitarian will bemoan the inequality resulting from a libertarian-individualist ethic, but the libertarian can retort “inequality is unavoidable, and the freedom and self-fulfillment inherent in individualism is the higher value.” The converse brings an opposite scenario.

Assuming ethical points of view freely compete for adherents within a democratic and pluralistic society, where tolerance and accommodation are valued—even if grudgingly—the ebb and flow of their cultural influence would ideally preclude the rise of a rigid hegemony. But for this optimistic scenario to mirror the real world, competing philosophies must share a belief in the practical, contingent and context-bound nature of moral reasoning and moral acceptance. Ethical absolutism cannot be retained. A significant degree of moral universalism exists in any pluralistic society—largely the common moral decencies and basic social/ethical standards that allow societies to exist—but absent over-arching ethical absolutes. Accepting the contingent nature of moral and social-political philosophies is essential for establishing vibrant, pluralistic societies, where differing philosophies co-exist, compete, yet acknowledge shared core principles.

Well documented historical and current examples of the tragedy of absolutism offer a grim picture, where absolutist ethical-political views have been forcefully engrained to the degree their adherents dismiss and denigrate the worth of pluralism. They seek to eradicate all but in-group thought, promoting an impoverished model of thinking and feeling, paralyzing human creativity. At the quarter point of the 21st Century, we are confronted with a struggle between liberal values and a cluster of absolutist movements. And it is no hyperbole to see beliefs in moral certitude as one of the most destructive tendencies of the human species, and central to our current conflict. Its influence has brought about uncounted suffering, and when paired with another negative human trait, the quest for total power and control, democratic, pluralistic societies are fundamentally threatened. We should also realize pluralism and democracy—liberal values in general—are not humanity’s default frame of mind. Our species has always included highly motivated groups and individuals rejecting and subverting the ethics of democratic, tolerant societies.

The influence of our darker side, whether absolutist thinking or craving total political power, can be held in-check only through concerted action of citizens fostering broad societal communication, supporting vital public institutions and strengthening the common bonds between the wider citizenry—creating contexts for toleration and democracy. Absolutist thinking will become an outlier only when pluralism becomes supported by a large portion of citizens in a noticeably public manner. Concern for democratic pluralism’s near and long-term success leads one to wonder where 21st Century’s humanity might be placed along the lengthy and turbulent story of our species—looking at our history as well as projecting alternative futures. Are we foolish to think the repetitive cycles of violent conflict, authoritarian societies and needless human suffering can be broken? I doubt we can ever eliminate aspects of the species’ dark side, but essential tasks are clear: we must describe and promote—in ordinary, accessible language—ethical principles basic to liberal societies. And they must be lived publicly. The future of pluralistic liberalism requires earnest, sincere and selfless persuasion toward our fellows.